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ABSTRACT. This paper explores the potential impacts of payments for agricultural
soil carbon sequestration on poverty of farm households and on the sustainability of
agricultural systems, using economic theory combined with evidence from three case
studies in Kenya, Peru, and Senegal. The case studies indicate that the likely impact of
carbon contracts will be to raise rural incomes and reduce the rate of soil carbon loss.
In some cases, carbon contracts may be able to stabilize soil carbon stocks at a higher
level than would otherwise be economically feasible. These findings suggest that carbon
payments could have a positive impact on the sustainability of production systems while
also reducing poverty. The analysis indicates that payments for environmental services
are most likely to have a positive impact when they are implemented in an enabling
economic and institutional environment.
Introduction
Throughout the world the focus of agricultural policy is shifting from
traditional subsidy and trade policies to conservation and environmental
aspects of agriculture. This shift in policy focus has been encouraged by
the incorporation of agriculture into the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade in the mid-1990s and the recent Doha Round of multilateral
trade negotiations. This shift in agricultural policy is also being driven
by a growing public demand for the ecosystem services associated
with agricultural land such as watershed protection and greenhouse gas
mitigation. In developing countries, an additional possible co-benefit of
providing farmers with payments for ecosystem services would be to
contribute to broader economic development objectives such as poverty
alleviation, food security, and sustainability. As yet there is insufficient
experience with ecosystem service payments to knowwhat their effects are
likely to be on these development objectives.
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The objective of this paper is to explore the potential impacts of payments
for agricultural soil carbon sequestration on poverty of farm households
and on the sustainability of agricultural systems, using economic theory
combined with evidence from three case studies in Kenya, Peru, and
Senegal. We focus specifically on agricultural soil carbon sequestration
for several reasons. First, soil degradation – in many cases the result of
or resulting in declining soil carbon contents – is widely regarded as a
major factor contributing to the persistent problems of poverty and food
insecurity, particularly in the most agriculturally marginal areas of the
developing world (Lynam et al., 1998). Second, soil carbon sequestration
has been proposed as a way to meet the joint goals of mitigating greenhouse
gas emissions while enhancing the productivity and sustainability of
agricultural lands, both in the industrialized and developing countries
(Lal et al., 1998; Soil Management CRSP, 2002). Moreover, due to the
likely positive correlation between soil degradation and rural poverty, soil
carbon sequestration might be a way to target farmers in the poorest, most
environmentally vulnerable areas. Third, as yet soil carbon sequestration
has not been widely implemented in the context of international agreements
such as the Kyoto Protocol, or in national policies, so there is little
information available from actual projects about the likely impacts.
After a brief introduction of the study sites, the first section discusses
the economic analysis of soil carbon sequestration contracts, and concludes
with a set of testable hypotheses about the impacts of carbon contracts
on poverty and sustainability. The next section describes the simulation
methods used in the three case studies, and then provides a description of
the three studies in Kenya, Peru, and Senegal. The following section uses
results from case studies to address the hypotheses identified in the first
section. The paper concludes with a discussion of policy implications.
The case studies
Machakos, Kenya
The Machakos study area includes Machakos, Makueni, and Mwingi
districts, is located southeast of Nairobi, and ranges in altitude between
400 to 2,100 meters above sea level. The area is approximately 20,000 km2 in
size and is located between 0◦70′ and 3◦00′ southern latitude and between
36◦87′ and 38◦51′ eastern longitude. The semi-arid climate in the study
area has low, highly variable rainfall, distributed in two rainy seasons. The
annual rainfall average ranges from 500 to 1,300 mm and mean annual
temperature vary from 15 ◦C to 25 ◦C. Soils in the region are rather shallow,
generally deficient in nitrogen and phosphorus and low in organic matter.
Moreover, low infiltration rates and susceptibility to sealing makes them
prone to erosion, especially since most of the rains occur at the beginning of
the growing season when the land is still bare. The region suffered extensive
soil degradation in the early to mid twentieth century, at which time
government programs caused large areas to be terraced. The success of these
programs has been documented by Tiffen et al. (1994). Though the region is
highly dependant on agriculture, its population obtains significant income
from non-farming activities inside and outside the district’s boundary.
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The farms can be characterized as subsistence-oriented mixed farming
systems that include both crop and livestock production. Maize is the most
important staple crop that is sold for cash, and a wide variety of subsistence
crops are grown, such as vegetables, fruits, and tubers.
Farm survey data were obtained from studies conducted in the 1997–
2001 period. The data covered 120 households in six villages with detailed
input and output data for nearly 2,700 fields. Further description of the
data can be found in de Jager et al. (2001) and Gachimbi et al. (2005). Two
of the villages in the study produce vegetables with irrigation and market
them to urban areas. Maize yields are generally low and crop failure is
widespread. Livestock was traditionally managed by letting it graze freely,
but intensive zero-grazing units are proliferating in the region in recent
years and their importance for nutrient recycling is considerable. Details
of the economic models are provided in Antle et al. (2005a). The carbon
contracts modelled require farmers to utilize minimum amounts of organic
fertilizer (600 kg/ha/season) and mineral fertilizer (60 kg/ha/year).
Cajamarca, Peru
The study focuses on the La Encan˜ada watershed in the Cajamarca region in
northern Peru. The 10 km2 watershed ranges between 2,950 to 4,000 meters
above sea level and is located between 7◦00′ and 7◦07′ southern latitude
and between 78◦15′ and 78◦22′ western longitude. Average annual rainfall
is low ranging between 430 mm/year in the valleys up to 550 mm/year in
the higher parts of the watershed (Romero and Stroosnijder, 2001). Soils are
shallow and calcaric clay matured on limestone parent material and more
profound, low in calcium, clay soils matured on claystone parent material.
This region is characterized by three agroecozones: the valley floors, the
lower hillsides, and the upper hillsides. Milk production dominates in the
valley floors where access to irrigation allows for cultivation of permanent
pastures. In the lower hillsides where little irrigation is available, field
crops dominate the production system, including Andean tubers, legumes,
cereals, and pasture. Cultivation in this zone occurs in two seasons,
December to May and June to September/November. In the upper hills
where risk of frost is high, natural pastures dominate the landscape.
The data used in this analysis were collected through farm surveys
conducted in 1997–1999 for a random stratified sample of 40 farm
households in five communities in the watershed (see Valdivia, 1999, 2002;
and Valdivia and Antle, 2002 for further details). The data show that crop
yields are low and parcel size is small, as is typical of this type of semi-
subsistence agriculture. Size distributions of the parcels and farms are
highly skewed, with a large number of very small parcels and farms and a
small number of much larger parcels and farms. The analysis reported here
is based on the lower-hillside region where cropland is the principal land
use. Valdivia (2002) and Antle et al. (2005b) provide details on the economic
models used in the simulations. Antle et al. (2007) provide details of the
carbon sequestration analysis, which is based on the adoption of terraces
and terraces with agroforestry (trees planted on the tops of terrace walls).
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Southern Peanut Basin, Senegal
The Nioro region of Senegal is in the southern part of Senegal’s ‘peanut
basin’ occupying the central part of the country. Nioro contains about
103,000 hectares of cropped area, or about 5 per cent of Senegal’s agricultural
area, and lies in the sudano-sahelian zone of the peanut basin, situated
between 13◦35′ and 13◦50′ northern latitude and 16◦00′ and 16◦30′ western
longitude with an average elevation of 40 meters above sea level. The rainy
season lasts from June to October, and the total annual rainfall is about 750
mm. Annual temperatures average 27,5 ◦C and the mean maximum and
minimum temperatures are respectively 38 ◦C and 15 ◦C. Most soils in the
Nioro area have been formed in materials that originate from ironstone or
the underlying sandstones. On the ironstone plateaus, soils are stony and
shallow. On the glacis, terraces and bas-fonds, soils are deep. In general, the
clay content increases with soil depth. Millet and peanuts, grown in annual
rotation, are the two main crops. These two crops represent almost 90 per
cent of Senegal’s cropped area in most years.
The data used in this study are cross sectional and come from farm
surveys organized and conducted by the Ecole Nationale d’Economie
Applique´e in 2001. More than a hundred households in 13 villages in the
Nioro area were surveyed to collect detailed socioeconomic and agricultural
production data, including household demographic characteristics, labor
availability, annual food grain production and consumption, annual income
and expenses, and agricultural inputs and outputs. Diagana et al. (2007)
provide a detailed description of the economic models used and the
specification of the carbon contracts based on incorporation of crop residues
and application of mineral fertilizer.
Economic analysis of soil carbon sequestration contracts
In this section we present the conceptual framework that is used as the
basis for the simulation studies described in the next section. The economic
analysis of agricultural carbon sequestration begins with a characterization
of the initial conditions before farmers have the option to participate in
carbon contracts. Antle et al. (2003) assume that in the initial conditions
without carbon contracts, farmers adopt those land use and management
practices that maximize economic returns (adjusted for risk if farmers are
risk averse), under the assumption of well-functioning factor and capital
markets and well-informed farmers. These assumptions imply that from the
farmer’s perspective, the initial conditions represent an efficient allocation
of resources, absent payments for carbon sequestration. Importantly, this
does not mean that farmers are managing soil carbon stocks efficiently from
a social perspective if a reduction of greenhouse gas concentrations has a
positive social value.
In the context of developing countries, there is much evidence that
productivity is constrained by low levels of soil organic matter and
consequently soil fertility (Kherallah et al., 2002; Koning et al., 2001; Sanchez,
2002; Scherr, 1999). The literature identifies many factors contributing to
this situation, including: policies that discriminate against agriculture; high
transportation costs, coupled with imperfect factor and capital markets;
high population densities and rapidly growing populations; lack of accurate
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information about the long-term consequences of management decisions,
particularly when it involves factors such as soil fertility that are difficult
to observe. In the analysis presented here we assume that farmers are
rational and make management decisions to maximize economic returns,
but we recognize that those decisions may be the result of various factors
that lead to a loss of soil productivity over time. Indeed, in the case
studies introduced above, field measurements show that productivity is
constrained by low levels of soil organic matter. The goal of the analysis is to
simulate the effects of introducing soil carbon contracts that require farmers
to increase incorporation of organic matter into the soil and to increase
the use of mineral fertilizer, and to adopt soil conservation investments
such as terraces and agroforestry. However, it is important to note that in
the baseline conditions that are observed without carbon contracts, some
farmers already apply relatively high rates of organic and mineral fertilizers,
or have constructed terraces, but in most cases adoption rates are low.
Table 1 shows that in the three case studies 20–76 per cent of farms did not
use any mineral fertilizer on their cash crops. The data also show that on
subsistence crops most farmers used lower rates of organic fertilizer and
almost no mineral fertilizer. The data from the Peru case study show that
about 18 per cent of the fields in the region are terraced, while the average
field slope in the region is over 20 per cent.
Contract design
In the case studies, the simulated carbon contracts provide payments
to farmers and require them to adopt certain land use or management
practices. In the cases of Senegal and Kenya, the contracts are based on
incorporation of crop residues and application of organic and mineral
fertilizers at specified rates; the Peru study considers adoption of terracing
and agroforestry practices. When fertilizer use is required, a key assumption
we make is that farmers participating in carbon contracts have access to
fertilizer at the market price when they are planting their crops, and have
the cash available to purchase the fertilizer when it is needed. Thus, if
farmers’ access to fertilizer is being constrained by imperfections in fertilizer
markets, we assume that the organization (either governmental or non-
governmental) acting as an intermediary to facilitate carbon contracts takes
whatever actions are needed to make the quantities of fertilizer required
under the contract available to farmers. In the Peru study, we consider
the case wherein farmers must pay the full price of the soil conservation
investments.
The economic simulations for the three case studies show that farmers
using low levels of fertilizer inputs would generally benefit economically
from using at least as much as required in the carbon contracts. This
finding supports the general view that factors such as credit and fertilizer
availability at planting time constrain profitable use of fertilizer. One way
that fertilizer use could be financed is by providing the carbon payments
in the form of fertilizer (Antle and Diagana, 2003). However, calculations
show that carbon payments at the beginning of the season would not
be sufficient to provide all of the fertilizer needed for the contracts. For
example, the simulations presented below for Kenya assume farmers utilize
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at least 60 kg N/ha per season and at least 600 kg of organic fertilizer/ha
per season. Under these assumptions, simulations show that farmers who
do not use any mineral fertilizer and low rates of organic amendments
would obtain an increase of about 0.6 MgC/ha/yr, or about 0.3 MgC/ha
per season (throughout we use MgC to denote mega-gram or metric ton
of carbon). If the price of carbon were $50/MgC, then the payment would
provide a payment of $15/ha per season. With a fertilizer price of about
$0.40/kg, this would provide the farmer with about 38 kg of fertilizer if the
payments were made in kind, thus falling short of the 60 kg required under
the contract. In addition, most farmers would also need to increase their
use of organic fertilizer.
In the case study of terracing in Peru, the issue of financing adoption of the
conservation practices may be even more critical. The cost of constructing
terraces on 1 hectare is estimated to be about $300/ha and the cost of
maintaining them is about $65/ha/yr (Valdivia, 2002). With an average
carbon rate of less than 1 MgC/ha/yr, at a carbon price of $50/MgC, farmers
would receive less than $50/ha/yr; thus the carbon payments would cover
part of the maintenance costs, but not the initial investment. Thus, we have
to consider the following analysis in light of these possible constraints on
adoption.
The carbon payments each season could be based either on the number
of hectares on which these practices are adopted (a per hectare payment),
or on the expected amount of carbon sequestered. In the latter case, the
contract is based on a per-tonne payment mechanism. As Antle et al. (2003)
show, the per-tonne payment mechanism is economically more efficient
because it pays farmers per unit of environmental service provided rather
than per hectare of land under contract regardless of the amount of carbon
sequestered. Accordingly, the case studies presented below simulate per-
tonne contracts based on carbon rates estimated by agro-ecozone. In other
words, the carbon contract specifies a payment based on the price of
carbon and the carbon rate estimated for the zone in which each field is
located. We assume that many individual farm fields are aggregated to
make up a standard marketable contract (e.g., 1,000 metric tones of carbon).
Carbon rates are verified for each contract using periodic randomly sampled
soil measurements. Analysis by Mooney et al. (2004) indicates that these
measurement and monitoring costs are likely to be small relative to the value
of the carbon sequestered. In the case of contract default, several possible
mechanisms could be used. One option would be for the entity aggregating
contracts to discount carbon rates for risk of default (in effect, maintaining
an insurance pool of sequestered carbon to offset defaults). Another option
would be to require repayment by defaulting farmers, although that may
not be feasible for small, poor farms.
Transaction costs
Setting up and verifying carbon contracts and insuring against default
will involve transaction costs that also must be estimated and factored
into the analysis. Few data are available to estimate transaction costs for
agricultural soil carbon sequestration (see Mooney et al., 2004; International
Energy Agency, 2005; Paustian et al., 2006). Some analysts argue that these
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transaction costs could be high for organizing small-scale farmers to adopt
practices on enough hectares to constitute marketable quantities of carbon,
but as yet no actual pilot projects have been implemented in which such
costs could be quantified. In the case studies presented here, because reliable
data on transaction costs are not available, transaction costs are included in
a sensitivity analysis.
Important informational issues arise in defining and verifying
compliance with carbon contracts and other contracts for payments for
environmental services. Soil carbon accumulation is a function of past
land use and management practices. Whereas it is relatively low-cost to
verify adoption of soil conservation investments such as terracing and
agroforestry, basing carbon payments on use of variable inputs such as
organic and mineral fertilizer raises the problem of knowing past practices
as well as monitoring compliance with the contract. Essentially, there is
an asymmetric information problem because farmers know their past and
current practices, but the entity responsible for verifying compliance with
contract does not. Efficient solutions to the asymmetric information problem
depend on designing incentive mechanisms that lower the cost of verifying
compliance. For example, successful micro-credit programs have utilized
self-enforcement mechanisms. However, if these information problems
cannot be addressed at low cost then there will be incentives for many
farmers to default on carbon contracts, similar to the problems encountered
in credit markets (e.g., see Blackman, 2001).
Risk and adoption of carbon-sequestering practices
Much research has addressed the impact of risk and risk aversion on
farmers’ adoption of technology, particularly in developing countries
(Sunding and Zilberman, 2001). In the case studies, risk is not formally
incorporated, and it is important to note that risk could impact farmers’
willingness to participate in carbon contracts both positively and negatively.
On the negative side, the use of inputs such as mineral fertilizer is often said
to increase production risk. However, increased use of organic fertilizers
and incorporation of crop residues and other organic matter is typically
assumed to stabilize production (e.g., by improving water-holding capacity
of the soil). Similarly, the use of terracing and other soil conservation
practices is generally believed to improve water availability and thus both
stabilize and increase productivity. Thus, the net risk effect of the set of
practices being adopted is not clear. In the case studies from Kenya and
Senegal, econometric tests did not support the hypothesis that either organic
or mineral fertilizer were risk-increasing inputs. Also on the positive side,
carbon payments would appear to represent a stable source of income as
compared to income from risky crops, although there could be some risk of
default on the contract as well as possible policy risk if the payments were
being made by an unreliable governmental or non-governmental entity.
Finally, because of concerns about permanence of soil carbon, some have
argued that carbon contracts would require farmers to adopt and maintain
appropriate land use and management practices for long periods of time,
say 20 years or longer. Such long-term contracts would impose costs on
farmers in the form of forgone option value due to uncertainty about
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the long-term productivity benefits of the practices, price uncertainty, and
political risk. However, it is not correct that carbon contracts would have
to require such long-term commitments by farmers. Instead, farmers can
be offered relatively short-term contracts with the option to renew, with
the price appropriately adjusted to reflect the implied non-permanence of
the carbon (e.g., see Lewandrowski et al., 2004). Thus, while the net effect
of carbon contracts on farmers’ perceptions of production and income risk
are not entirely clear, both logic and available evidence do not suggest that
farmers would perceive them as substantially increasing the risk they face,
and may well decrease risk.
Modeling farmer participation in carbon contracts
Following Antle and Diagana (2003) the analysis is formalized by assuming
that to increase the stock of soil organic carbon (SOC) on a land unit, a farmer
must make a change from production system i (conventional) that had
been followed over some previous period (the historical land-use baseline)
to some alternative (conservation) system s. We assume that utilization
of management practice i up to time 0 results in a SOC level of C(i), and
adoption of practice s at time 0 causes the level to increase to an equilibrium
C(s) at time T. At time T, the soil reaches a new level at which the level of
soil C stabilizes until further changes in management occur. In defining
ex ante carbon contracts, we emphasize that the expected change in carbon
accumulation is the relevant variable; the actual rate of carbon accumulation
will typically only be verified for the land units aggregated into a contract, as
discussed by Antle et al. (2003). This expected change in carbon is assumed to
be estimated by agro-ecozone and past land-use practices, with all farmers
in the contract in that zone receiving credit for the same rate, as explained
further below.
With a per-ton carbon contract, the farmer receives a payment of $Pt per
ton of C sequestered each time period, so if the farmer changes from practice
i to practice s and soil C is expected to increase by ct(i,s) tons per hectare
per period, the farmer receives a payment of Ptct(i,s) per hectare per
period. The net present value (NPV) of changing from system i to system s
for T periods is given by
NPV(i , s) =
T∑
t=1
Dt[NR(pt , wt , zt , s) + gt(i , s) − Mt(i , s)] − I (i , s) (1)
where Dt = (1/(1+r))t and r is the interest rate per time period, NR(pt, wt,
zt, s) is expected net returns per hectare for system s in period t, given
product price pt, input prices wt, and capital services zt; gt(i,s) = gt if a
per-hectare contract, or gt(i,s) = Ptct(i,s) if a per-ton contract; Mt(i,s) is the
variable cost per period for changing from system i to s; and I(i,s) is the fixed
cost for changing from system i to system s (both variable and fixed costs of
adoption may include transaction costs). If the farmer does not participate in
the contract and continues producing with system i, then gt(i,s) = Mt(i,s) =
I(i,s) = 0 and the farmer earns NPV(i). The farmer enters the contract if and
only if NPV(i,s) > NPV(i), and does not enter the contract otherwise.
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To simplify this discussion, it is useful to consider the special case where
NR(p, w, z, s), P, c(i,s), and M(i,s) are constant over time. If we also let the
fixed investment be converted into an equivalent annuity of fc(i,s) dollars
per period, then the expression NPV(i,s) > NPV(i) can be simplified to
NR(p, w, z, s) + g(i , s) − M(i , s) − f c(i , s) > NR(p, w, z, i). (2)
Note that under these assumptions, if it is profitable to enter the contract in
one period, it is profitable in all periods regardless of the discount rate. More
generally, the discount rate will play an important role, as in the analysis of
terracing in Peru. This expression has several implications for analysis of
adoption of soil carbon sequestration practices.
In the initial equilibrium in which there are no payments available for car-
bon sequestration, g = 0, and the farmer adopts the conservation practice s
only if it provides higher net returns than the conventional practice i. When
a carbon contract is offered for adoption of practices that sequester carbon,
g > 0 and we can rewrite equation (2) as
g(i , s) > NR(p, w, z, i) − NR(p, w, z, s) + M(i , s) + f c(i , s). (3)
The expression on the right-hand side is the opportunity cost for switching
to system s from system i. The farmer will switch practices when the
opportunity cost is less than the payment per period. In the case of a per-ton
contract, g(i,s) = Pc(i,s) and the condition for participation in the contract
can be expressed as
P > {NR(p, w, z, i) − NR(p, w, z, s) + M(i , s) + f c(i , s)}/c(i , s), (4)
showing that the farmer will be willing to enter a carbon contract when the
price per tonne of carbon is greater than the opportunity cost per tonne.
A critical feature of equation (4) is the spatial variation in the opportunity
cost. Net returns to the conventional and alternative practices are site-
specific. Some components of the variable and fixed costs of changing
practices may be site-specific (e.g., the cost of constructing a terrace),
whereas transaction costs may be spatially invariant. The denominator of
(4), the expected rate of carbon accumulation, is specific to the agro-ecozone
where the land unit is located, as noted above. Thus, the participation
by farmers in carbon contracts depends on the spatial distribution of the
opportunity cost of changing practices. Those land units with opportunity
cost less than P will participate in the contract, and those land units with
a higher opportunity cost will not participate. Summing the quantities of
carbon across participating land units at each price gives the carbon supply
curve for the region.
In the discussion thus far, we have assumed that the practices i and s
involve a binary choice, such as the use of terracing on a field. In the case
of incorporation of organic matter and use of fertilizer, however, while it
is true that many farmers use no fertilizer, many farmers may use positive
amounts but less than the quantities required by the carbon contract. In that
case, the carbon rate used to calculate the payment is adjusted to reflect the
fact that a smaller amount of carbon will be added to the soil before the new
equilibrium stock of carbon is attained. The simulation studies discussed
below assume that for a required input rate xc specified in the contract,
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farmers who have been using a baseline rate xb less than xc receive credit
for a carbon rate in proportion to the difference between the base rate and
the contract rate, and receive zero credit otherwise
c(i , s, xc , xb) = c(i , s)(xc − xb)/xc , xc − xb > 0
= 0 otherwise. (5)
The baseline rate of input use is defined as the average rate used by the
farmer on a field, over a specified period of time, before the field was entered
into a carbon contract.
Carbon sequestration, poverty, and food insecurity
Once the analysis of farmer participation in carbon contracts is carried out
we can investigate the question of whether farmers are better off, in terms of
income and food security, by participating in a carbon contract. When there
is a net benefit, there is the question of how those benefits are distributed.
Carbon contracts that provide cash payments or payments in kind
contribute to household income. However, the impact on farm production
and income is less clear. We assume that rational farmers who participate do
perceive a net economic gain, but for farmers facing a positive opportunity
cost to adoption of the carbon-sequestering practice, the net impact on
income is less than the payment for all except the marginal land unit. The
impact on food security will depend on the production impacts of the
alternative practice. In most cases, practices that increase soil carbon are
expected to improve both average productivity and stabilize production,
thus enhancing food security of semi-subsistence households that depend
on their own production for food security.
The distributional effects of payments for environmental services
depend on a number of factors as well. From the regional or national
perspective, it is a well-established fact that rural households in developing
countries typically have lower incomes and are less food-secure than urban
households. Data from recent poverty-mapping research (Government of
Kenya, 2003) show this fact clearly for Kenya, where rural poverty rates
exceed 50 per cent in most areas and 90 per cent in some areas. Data from
Peru show similar patterns, with poverty among rural house holds occuring
at much higher rates than among urban households (Interinstitutional
Commission, 2005; Zeller et al., 2005), and the survey data utilized in the
case study show that poverty rates in rural Senegal are also extremely high.
Therefore, environmental service payment schemes should contribute to
poverty reduction and food insecurity in rural areas. However, because
the payments for environmental services primarily benefit the owners
of land, the impact will also depend on the pattern of land ownership
and the prevalence of landless poor in rural areas. On the one hand,
payments for afforestation or improved forestry management may largely
go to land owners with relatively high incomes when land ownership is
highly skewed. On the other hand, in areas where the principal land use is
small-scale agriculture, and payments are based on adoption of agricultural
practices, payments for environmental services will go primarily to rural
households, and most of these households will have low incomes.
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There is also the question of how payments for environmental services
will be distributed within rural farm household populations. Equation (5)
shows that the rate of carbon sequestration credited to a farmer in a carbon
contract depends on prior adoption of the practice. To the extent that
adoption of more sustainable practices is constrained by factors associated
with poverty and food insecurity, carbon contracts based on adoption
should tend to target farm households that are poor and food insecure.
The data in table 1 indicate that in the three case studies, there is a tendency
for farm households that do not use mineral fertilizer on cash crops and
that do not adopt terraces to be smaller, to have lower farm and off-farm
income, and to be less specialized in cash crop production (although the
direction of causality in these relationships is not clear).
Equation (4) shows that the opportunity cost of adopting the carbon-
sequestering practice s depends on two factors. In the numerator is the
forgone returns from changing from the conventional practice i to the
alternative practice s. Typically, the conventional practice (e.g., not using soil
conservation practices or using low rates of organic matter incorporation)
has the highest productivity on the land with inherently favorable soil
and climatic properties, and the value of the conservation practice may
be relatively low in these favorable conditions. Therefore, the forgone
returns to adopting the carbon-sequestering practices are likely to be high
on relatively good land and low on marginal lands. The opportunity
cost also depends on how much carbon is sequestered per hectare (the
denominator of equation (4)). Land with favorable properties may have the
highest potential for carbon sequestration, even if the land is not highly
degraded, as compared to marginally productive land. An interesting side
effect is that those lands produce the largest quantities of crop residues and
consequently farmers will have larger amounts of organic amendments
available for incorporation. Therefore, marginal lands are not necessarily
more economically efficient at sequestering carbon, and indeed the opposite
may be true.
In some cases, the opportunity cost of adopting carbon-sequestering
practices may actually be negative when factor market distortions or
imperfect information cause farmers not to adopt profitable conservation
practices. For example, the farmer may perceive that the opportunity cost
of adoption is positive due to uncertainty about the future productivity
of the conserving practice. Payments for carbon sequestration may
induce such a farmer to adopt, and then learn that the practice is
profitable even without an incentive payment. To the extent that these
uncertainties are correlated with poverty and food insecurity, then carbon
payments would indeed target benefits to the most poor and food-insecure
farmers.
Finally, transaction costs could also impact the participation of farms
differentially in terms of land quality and size. Larger, wealthier farms are
more likely to be located on more favorable land where carbon rates are
higher. Equation (4) shows that the opportunity cost of a fixed transaction
cost will be smaller per unit of carbon sequestered where carbon rates are
higher. Similarly, if there is a component of transaction costs that is fixed
per farm (e.g., associated with learning about carbon contracts), then the
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average transaction cost per hectare will be lower for larger farms (Antle,
2002).
Hypotheses: poverty, food security, and sustainability
The preceding discussion shows that there are a variety of factors affecting
adoption of practices that increase soil carbon and the sustainability of
production systems. The impact of these practices and carbon payments
on poverty also depends on a number of factors. We can conclude that the
net effect of these various factors is an empirical question. In summary, we
have the following hypotheses about the impacts of carbon sequestration
on poverty, food security, and sustainability:
H1: Carbon contracts increase adoption of sustainable practices.
H2: Carbon contracts transform unsustainable agricultural systems into
sustainable systems.
H3: Carbon contracts increase aggregate rural income.
H4: Carbon contracts reduce poverty and food insecurity in the rural farm
population.
H5: The impacts of carbon contracts on poverty and food insecurity are
greatest in the poorest regions and households.
H6: Transaction costs substantially reduce participation in carbon
contracts.
Simulation model design and implementation
All three of the case studies are based on the simulation methods described
in Antle and Capalbo (2001), Stoorvogel et al. (2001, 2004). Since the models
used in each case study are presented in detail elsewhere as noted below,
we provide a general overview of the simulation model approach here and
refer the reader to the supporting publications for further information.
Each of the three case studies was executed using the tradeoff analysis
modeling approach implemented with the Tradeoff Analysis software. In
this approach, spatially explicit disciplinary data and models are coupled
to simulate the production system, following the scheme presented in
figure 1. The Tradeoff Analysis system consists of several components
(Stoorvogel et al., 2001):
Data: The model begins with three types of data: environmental data,
farm survey data, and experimental data. Environmental data describe the
spatial variation in soils and climate and are organized in a GIS format.
They are used as inputs into the bio-physical models and to stratify the
study area. Farm survey data describe the way farmers take decisions
about land management. This decision-making process is described in the
econometric production models. The tradeoff analysis uses crop models
to describe the inherent productivity of farmers’ fields (as an important
driving factor in their decision-making process) and environmental impact
models to estimate the impact on soil and water resources (e.g., soil erosion,
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Figure 1. Integrated assessment of soil carbon sequestration (Antle, 2002).
pesticide leaching). These mechanistic models need to be calibrated to local
conditions using experimental data.
Crop models: Crop (and if appropriate, livestock) models in the DSSAT
format are used to estimate the spatial and temporal variation in indexes
of inherent productivity of the land (crop yield estimated with standard
management) that is driven by soil and climate variations. These measures
of inherent productivity are used as inputs into the economic models
to explain variation in management decisions of farmers. When the
DSSAT/Century model is used, both crop yields and soil C values are
passed to the economic analysis (Tsuji et al., 1994; Gijsman et al., 2002).
Economic simulation models: Econometric production models are estimated
using the farm survey data and the inherent productivity indexes derived
from the crop models. Parameters for spatial distributions of prices and
other exogenous variables in the production models are estimated using
the survey data. Using a spatial characterization of the farm population, a
random sample of farm and field locations is sampled in the agro-ecozones
to be simulated. An econometric-process simulation model utilizes the
production model and price distribution parameters to simulate the land
use and management decisions of farmers on a site-specific basis.
Environmental process models: As appropriate to the analysis, the
management decisions from the economic simulation model (e.g., land
use, fertilizer use, pesticide applications) can be used as inputs into
environmental process models to estimate impacts on soil quality, pesticide
fate, and other environmental processes of interest.
Scenario definition, model execution, and analysis of outcomes: For each
policy or technology scenario of interest to policy decision makers, the
simulation model is executed for a series of price or other parameter
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settings. Changes in prices and other parameters can be used to induce
changes in management that in turn induce tradeoffs between economic
and environmental outcomes. In the analysis of soil C sequestration, key
parameters are the requirements for participation in a carbon contract
and the price of carbon. Economic outcomes from the econometric-process
simulation model (e.g., participation in carbon contracts, value of crop, and
livestock production) can be aggregated to represent a spatial unit made up
of many fields (e.g., the farms participating in a carbon contract).
Application of the tradeoff analysis model to analysis of soil C sequestration:
The tradeoff analysis model can be used to analyze the potential for soil C
sequestration contracts as shown in figure 1. The first step is to assemble
the data needed, including the data for implementation of the crop growth
and soil carbon models (e.g., the DSSAT/Century model – see Gijsman
et al., 2002) and the econometric-process simulation model for the region
to be analyzed. In addition, any relevant scenarios regarding alternative
production technologies that could be used to sequester soil C and the
types of contracts that would be used need to be assembled. The crop
and carbon simulation models are executed for the set of fields that being
used in the analysis (this could be a set of fields randomly sampled from
the region being analyzed using a map of the region, or a set of fields
randomly sampled in a production survey). Crop yields and soil C values
are saved in a file that becomes an input into the econometric-process
simulation model. This economic model simulates farmer’s land use and
management decisions for the baseline case of no carbon contracts, and for
the types of contracts that farmers could be offered. The economic model
creates an output file containing the farmer’s land use and management
decisions and the changes in soil C associated with those decisions. This
information is passed to other environmental process models to analyze
other environmental impacts such as soil erosion or fate of pesticides.
Finally, the results of the various models are combined into an output file
that can be aggregated to represent the region and used for various types
of analysis. For the analysis of soil C sequestration, a principal use of this
output is to construct a supply curve for soil C corresponding to each type
of contract that was simulated. If other environmental process models were
included in the analysis, it is also possible to assess tradeoffs with other
environmental impacts, such as soil erosion, water quality, and future soil
productivity.
Evidence on carbon sequestration, poverty, food security,
and sustainability
H1: Carbon contracts increase adoption of sustainable practices
Figures 2–4 show simulated contract participation rates for the three case
studies. All three studies support the hypothesis that carbon contracts
would substantially increase adoption of carbon-sequestering practices,
although the degree of participation would depend importantly on the
price of carbon and other factors such as transaction costs, and the rate
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Figure 2. Simulated participation in carbon contracts, Machakos, Kenya.
of participation would vary spatially according to local bio-physical and
economic conditions.
The results on contract participation in Kenya are stratified by village
(figure 2). Villages 1–4 are characterized by rainfed agriculture, whereas
villages 5 and 6 are predominantly irrigated vegetable production. As table 1
shows, fertilizer use is relatively high in irrigated agriculture, but very low
in rainfed crops. This fact explains the pattern shown in figure 2, with
very high participation rates in villages 1–4 and lower rates in villages 5
and 6. Recall that the simulations are based on the assumption that the
fertilizer required by the contract is available to farmers at the prevailing
market price, and that they have the resources available to buy it, possibly
by making the carbon payments in the form of fertilizer. The economic
simulations show that most farms that are utilizing zero or low rates of
fertilizer would earn higher returns by using more fertilizer, even if they
pay the market price. Thus, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis
that farmers in this region generally are under-utilizing fertilizer because of
constraints on fertilizer availability or financing, not because the fertilizer
price makes fertilizer unprofitable.
Figure 3 shows participation in carbon contracts simulated in the peanut
basin of Senegal. The analysis is not stratified by region due to the relatively
small amount of spatial variation in conditions in the study area. The
figure shows results for simulations assuming farmers increase use of
mineral fertilizer and also increase incorporation of crop residues into the
soil, with two assumptions about transaction costs (discussed below). The
simulations show a pattern similar to Kenya, but with generally lower
participation rates, presumably because a much higher percentage of farms
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Figure 3. Simulated participation in carbon contracts, Senegal peanut basin (R denotes
percent of crop residue incorporation, TC denotes transaction cost in dollars per hectare
per season).
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Figure 4. Simulated participation in carbon contracts, Cajamarca, Peru, for adoption
of terraces and agroforestry on fields with low and high slopes.
use fertilizer without carbon contracts (81 per cent in Senegal, compared to
41 per cent of rainfed farms in Kenya, table 1).
Figure 4 shows carbon contract participation in Peru for terracing
investments alone, and for terracing combined with agroforestry. The
simulations were conducted for terraces on fields with low slopes and
high slopes, to represent the effects on land with more and less favorable
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Figure 5. Rate of change in soil carbon versus poverty gap with carbon contracts,
Machakos, Kenya (Left-most point corresponds to a zero carbon price, the price increases
to $200/MgC at the right-most point).
productivity characteristics. The points on the horizontal axis with a zero
carbon price represent the rates of adoption without carbon payments.
Terracing alone is profitable for a larger proportion of fields at zero or low
carbon prices, and profitable for a substantially higher proportion of steeply
sloped fields.
The various case studies show that carbon payments do increase the
adoption of more sustainable practices. However, it should be noted that,
depending on the agro-ecological conditions, carbon contracts do not
necessarily result in positive carbon gains but rather result in a decrease
in carbon losses over time.
H2: Carbon contracts transform unsustainable agricultural systems into
sustainable systems
The results from the three studies suggest that in some cases, the
combination of appropriate practices and sufficiently high carbon payments
could move production systems to a much higher degree of sustainability,
but in some areas that are experiencing high rates of degradation this could
not be attained at plausible carbon prices.
Figure 5 shows the impact of carbon contracts on the average rate of
change in soil carbon simulated for farms in the Machakos, Kenya villages,
in the base case (the value on the x-axis at a zero carbon price) and with
farmers participating in carbon contracts. The data show that without
carbon contracts, the rate of change in soil carbon ranges from −0.17 to
−0.68 MgC/ha/yr across the six villages. With introduction of carbon
contracts, this rate approaches zero for villages 1, 2, and 4, and is reduced
from about −0.46 to about −0.20 MgC/ha/yr for village 4. Villages 3 and 6
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Figure 6. Rate of change in soil carbon versus poverty gap with carbon contracts,
Senegal peanut basin (Left-most point corresponds to a zero carbon price, the price
increases to $200/MgC at the right-most point; R denotes percent of crop residue
incorporation required in the carbon contract).
see their rates of carbon loss reduced but remain relatively high. In this case
the carbon contract results in a reduction in the rate of soil carbon loss, but
the system remains unsustainable because there is an ongoing net loss of soil
organic carbon. The implication is that the system will eventually approach
a low-level equilibrium for both soil carbon stocks and crop productivity.
In this case the carbon contract results in lower rate of soil carbon loss, but
the system remains unsustainable.
Data from the Senegal study showed a baseline rate of change in soil
carbon of about −0.60 MgC/ha/yr (figure 6), similar to the high rates of
loss found in some of the Kenyan sites. When 50 per cent of crop residues are
incorporated, the rate of carbon loss declines by about half, but is still near
–0.30 MgC/ha/yr. Under the scenario of 100 per cent residue incorporation,
however, the average rate of change in soil carbon is greater than
0.10 MgC/ha/yr. The main effect on the carbon rate comes from the in-
creased residue incorporation by farmers who are induced to enter contracts
at a low carbon price in order to gain access to fertilizer, as shown by the fact
that the average carbon rate is little affected by a higher price of carbon.
Taken together, the Kenya and Senegal studies tell a similar story about
the impacts of contracts based on increased use of organic material and
mineral fertilizer. In areas where rates of carbon loss are relatively low,
carbon contracts appear to have the potential to stabilize soil carbon stocks,
but in areas where the rates of loss are relatively high, carbon contracts
are unlikely to transform unsustainable systems to sustainable ones unless
carbon prices are extremely high and farmers radically increase the amount
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of crop residue being incorporated into the soil (i.e., in the range of
$200/MgC or higher).
Field research in Peru showed that terracing would increase soil carbon
by about 6 MgC/ha/yr over ten years, and then stabilize soil C at that level
or continue to increase gradually until a somewhat higher equilibrium soil C
stock was attained. The terracing study showed that carbon contracts would
increase adoption of terracing from 43 to 61 per cent on low-slope fields at a
carbon price of $100/MgC, and from 61 to 81 per cent on high-slope fields at
$100/MgC, but would not approach 100 per cent adoption until the carbon
price were as high as $300/MgC (figure 4). The Peru study also showed that,
due to the costs of agroforestry investments, the adoption rate of terraces
with agroforestry would be lower without carbon contracts, but due to
the higher carbon rates associated with the combination of terracing and
agroforestry, the increase in adoption would be greater, so that at sufficiently
high carbon prices the overall rate of adoption could be higher. Thus, we
can conclude that in the case of terracing and agroforesty in Peru, carbon
contracts would increase the sustainability of the system, but the degree of
improvement would be sensitive to the price of carbon and the vulnerability
of the field to degradation.
H3: Carbon contracts increase aggregate rural income
Figures 7, 8, and 9 show net returns per hectare in the three study areas,
with the point at a zero carbon price indicating the returns without carbon
contracts. These figures show that returns respond somewhat differently
in each case. In Kenya, the main effect comes from farmers entering into
contacts and using more fertilizer, hence the carbon price has a relatively
small effect on revenue. In Senegal and Peru, participation increases more
gradually with the carbon price, and consequently the revenue effect is
greater, particularly in the scenarios in which carbon rates are higher.
H4: Carbon contracts reduce poverty and food insecurity in the rural farm
population
Data were available for household income for the Kenya and Senegal
studies. Figures 5 and 6 show the poverty gap for the Kenya and Senegal
study areas, where the poverty gap is defined as the Foster et al. (1984)
poverty index for population size N, α = 1 and the poverty line PL set equal
to $1/day per household member
FGT(α) = (1/N)
∑
m=1,N
(1 − ym/PL)α. (6)
The data from Kenya show that carbon contracts have a relatively small
impact on poverty in most of the villages, even as the carbon price increases
towards the upper limit of $200/MgC in the simulation. Two villages show
a more substantial effect of both the initial entry into contracts and a higher
price. The simulations for Senegal show little effect of the initial entry into
contracts at a low price. However, a higher carbon price has some impact on
poverty, particularly for the scenario of 100 per cent residue incorporation,
lowering the poverty gap index from over 60 per cent to less than 50 per
cent.
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Figure 7. Net returns with carbon contracts in Machakos, Kenya.
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Figure 8. Net returns per hectare with carbon contracts in the Senegal peanut basin.
H5: The impacts of carbon contracts on poverty and food insecurity are greatest in
the poorest regions and households
Figure 5 provides little evidence to support this hypothesis, as it shows that
carbon contracts reduce poverty the most in villages 4 and 6, yet villages 2
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Figure 10. Average income per person versus poverty gap with carbon contracts in
Machakos, Kenya (Left-most point corresponds to a zero carbon price, the price increases
to $200/MgC at the right-most point).
has the highest initial poverty gap and carbon contracts appear to have little
effect on poverty there. This fact is confirmed by figure 10 which shows the
relationship between income per person and the poverty gap as the carbon
price varies from zero to $200/MgC. In Senegal, where the poverty level
is similar to the poorer villages in Kenya, the impact on poverty is also
small unless the carbon price is above $100/MgC. Although household
data were not available for the Peru study, figure 9 shows little difference
in the effect of carbon payments in the low-slope and high-slope fields,
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indicating that the effect on poverty would not be different between farms
with predominantly lower or higher slopes.
H6: Transaction costs substantially reduce participation in carbon contracts
Figure 3 shows results from Senegal with transaction costs at a relatively
low value ($2 per hectare) and a relatively high value ($10 per hectare). The
simulations show that the effect of the higher transaction cost is small for the
case in which all crop residues are incorporated, because the carbon rate is
sufficiently high to offset the effect of the transaction cost on the opportunity
cost per ton of carbon. However, in the scenario with 50 per cent residue
incorporation, the higher transaction cost does have a substantial effect on
the participation rate, reducing it from 25 per cent to zero when the carbon
price is $10/MgC, but having a smaller impact as the carbon price increases.
Similar results were obtained in the Kenya simulations.
Conclusions
This paper explores the potential impacts of payments for agricultural
soil carbon sequestration on poverty of farm households and on the
sustainability of agricultural systems, using economic theory combined
with evidence from three case studies in Kenya, Peru, and Senegal. The
first section of the paper uses economic analysis to show that there are a
variety of technical and economic factors affecting adoption of practices that
increase soil carbon and the sustainability of production systems. Likewise
many of these factors will impact how payments for environmental services
such as carbon sequestration could affect poverty in the farm population
of developing countries. Therefore, the net effect of these various factors
on participation in carbon contracts and the impact on poverty and
sustainability is an empirical question. Six hypotheses were identified,
which were then tested using simulations from the three case studies.
All three studies support the first hypothesis that carbon contracts
would substantially increase adoption of carbon-sequestering practices,
although the degree of participation would depend importantly on the
price of carbon and other factors such as transaction costs, and the rate
of participation would vary spatially according to local bio-physical and
economic conditions.
The second hypothesis is that carbon contracts transform unsustainable
agricultural systems into sustainable systems. The results from the three
studies suggest that in some cases, the combination of appropriate practices
and sufficiently high carbon payments could move production systems to
a much higher degree of sustainability and stabilize carbon stocks at higher
levels than would have otherwise been the case. However, in areas that are
experiencing high rates of degradation this transition to a more sustainable
system is not likely to be attained at plausible carbon prices.
The case studies support the hypothesis that carbon contracts would
increase aggregate income in rural areas, but the impacts on poverty
were found to be relatively small. Moreover, neither the economic analysis
presented, nor the results of the case studies, support the hypothesis that the
impacts of carbon contracts on poverty and food insecurity are necessarily
greatest in the poorest regions and households.
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Finally, transaction costs were found to have a substantial effect on
participation in carbon contracts in areas where expected rates of carbon
accumulation are low and when carbon prices are low. This finding means
that the impacts of transaction costs on participation are likely to be greatest
in marginal areas – such as semi-arid areas with sandy soils – where soil
carbon accumulation rates are typically lower than in areas with better soils
and more rainfall or access to irrigation.
In conclusion, the economic analysis presented in this paper, and the
empirical results of the three case studies, all suggest that the likely impact
of carbon contracts will be to raise rural incomes and reduce the rate of soil
carbon loss. In some cases, for example when it is feasible to substantially
increase the incorporation of organic matter at relatively low cost, carbon
contracts may be able to stabilize soil carbon stocks at a higher level than
would otherwise be economically feasible. Given that rural areas dominated
by small farms are typically the poorest parts of most developing countries,
these findings suggest that carbon payments could have a positive impact
on the sustainability of these systems while also reducing poverty. However,
these conclusions must be tempered by the finding that the impacts on
poverty are likely to be relatively small, and in areas where degradation is
highest and people are often poorest, carbon payments do not appear to be
capable of transforming unsustainable systems into sustainable ones. Addi-
tionally, as noted in the economic analysis presented in this paper, the parti-
cipation of poor farmers in carbon contracts is likely to be constrained by the
same factors that have inhibited their use of more productive, more sustain-
able practices in the first place. Thus, payments for environmental services
are not a pancea and are most likely to have a positive impact when they
are implemented in an enabling economic and institutional environment.
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